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Reuven Brandt on parental responsibility and gamete donation 
Many jurisdictions have enacted policies governing assisted reproduction that permit the
separation of legal parenthood from biological parenthood, at least when certain conditions are
satisﬁed. As a result of these policies, it is the individuals seeking donor gametes (sperm and/or
ova) and not the gamete donors that the state recognizes a child’s legal parent(s) from the
moment of birth. This enables individuals seeking to use donor gametes to do so without fear that
the state might deny them parental standing, or give competing parental rights to gamete donors.
It also protects gamete donors from legal obligations, such as child maintenance, that might
otherwise arise as a consequence of their role in reproduction.
While such policies have been of beneﬁt to many, some have contested their ethical permissibility
on the grounds that gamete donation is relevantly similar to other reproductive activities where wedo think that biological parents ought to acquire moral and legal parental obligations. Consider, for
example, a case in which contraception fails during a one-night-stand, and a child is born as a
result. Here there is general (though not universal) agreement that the biological father has
responsibilities towards his biological child even though he did not intend to become a parent at
the onset of the sexual encounter. In this case, it certainly seems that freely and wilfully engaging
in an activity that has the potential to result in the creation of a child is all that  is required to gain
parental responsibilities, if a child does in fact result. But why then does this differ from the gamete
donor case?
A philosophical account of parenthood capable of distinguishing the one-night-stand case from the
gamete donor case would certainly help resolve these differing intuitions we may have about
responsibilities in these two cases. However, to date no such account has been fully successful.
An alternate way forward is to argue that parental responsibility can be transferred.  According to
this view, even if gamete donors initially acquire responsibilities towards their biological children,
these can be transferred, under the right circumstances, to the intending parents. The major
upshot of this approach is that it would provide an ethical justiﬁcation for policies that recognize
intending parents as children’ sole parents without having to resolve questions about how parental
responsibilities arise in the ﬁrst place; however they arise, they can be transferred from donor to
intending parent.
While many ethicists have endorsed the view that parental responsibilities are transferrable,  it has
two serious problems. The ﬁrst is that arguments in favour of the transferability of parental
responsibilities generally fail to take into account the difference between transferring and
delegating responsibilities. The second is that, on further reﬂection, gamete donors do not seem
entitled to transfer their responsibilities because these are in effect obligations owed to their
offspring.
First let us consider the case made for the transferability of responsibilities. Most authors who
argue for this position do so by claiming that transferring some subset of parental responsibilities
to others is in fact common and uncontroversial. They point to practices such as putting children in
boarding schools or under the care of babysitters as examples of transfers of parental
responsibility that are generally thought to be morally unproblematic. All that is involved in the
gamete donor case, they claim, is a more extensive and protracted transfer of parental
responsibility; this is merely a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind.
However, on closer examination it is not clear that the examples provided to motivate this position
are examples of transfers of responsibility at all. In order to see why, it is helpful to ﬁrst draw a
distinction between transferring and delegating responsibilities, and this is best done through use
of an example. Consider the following case:
Jamie and Bill are both members of a student government. Jamie is in charge of
communication and Bill is charge of internal affairs. After some discussion the student
government decides to alter the duties of each posts so that the weekly newsletter becomes
the responsibility of the internal affairs chair rather than the communications chair. Following
this change, Bill gets a friend to do the newsletter for him so that he can have a long weekend
off.
Here we would say that both a transfer and a delegation of responsibility occurred. The
responsibility to produce the newsletter was transferred from Jamie to Bill, and then Bill delegated
the responsibility to produce the next newsletter to his friend. This is not just a semantic point, as it
reveals important features about the structure of the resulting responsibilities. Following the
transfer of responsibility, we do not think that Jamie has any special duty (beyond what we might
expect from any other board member) to make sure the newsletter gets produced if its completion
seems to be in jeopardy. However, we do think that if Bill’s friend backs out at the last minute, Billdoes have a duty to either complete the newsletter himself or ﬁnd someone else to do it.
When a responsibility is transferred, its initial barer no longer has any trace of it—it is as if they had
never had the responsibility in the ﬁrst place. By contrast, when a responsibility is delegated, the
delegator still has the obligation to make sure it gets fulﬁlled.
If we re-examine the examples offered above, of babysitting and boarding school, it becomes clear
these are cases of delegation and not transfer. For instance, if a parent discovers that a boarding
school is not providing their child with adequate care—say, by not providing adequate meals—the
parent has an obligation to withdraw their child from the school and make alternate arrangements
that do satisfy their child’s needs. Since the parent retains the obligation to ensure their child is
properly cared for, the parent has only delegated responsibility and not transferred it. It thus does
not seem that appealing to these kinds of practices supports the claim that parental responsibilities
can be completely transferred to others—in the standard parenthood case, responsibility is
delegated and the parent is never fully ‘off the hook’.
That transferring parental responsibility is not as commonplace as others have suggested in no
way demonstrates that such transfers are not possible at all. However, there are other reasons to
doubt that such transfers are morally permissible. Consider the following example:
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Mary borrows a book from the library. Instead of returning the book herself, she has John do it in
exchange for ﬁxing his bike. Unfortunately, John loses the book on the way to the library. The
library asks Mary to pay to replace the book, but she refuses, arguing that she had transferred the
responsibility to John, and so they should seek compensation from him.
In this example, Mary’s response seems unreasonable. After acquiring the responsibility to take
care of the library book, she cannot simply unilaterally transfer this responsibility to someone else.
Since she is the person who withdrew the book from the library, she is ultimately responsible for its
safekeeping. While she might have cause to get compensation from John on account of his
negligence, this does not seem to alter her obligation to the library.
This analysis is relevant to reproductive cases because the common view is that parents have
obligations to their children. If we take this view of parental obligation, it seems unclear how an
agreement with the intending parents could absolve a gamete donor of these obligations, just like
it seems unclear how an agreement between Mary and John could absolve Mary of her obligation
to the library. Thus in the reproductive case, if it turns out that gamete donors do in fact acquire
parental responsibilities, it does not seem like these could be unilaterally transferred to intending
parents.
What I hope to have shown is that there are two good reasons to be suspicious of the claim that
parental responsibilities can be easily transferred. The ﬁrst is that, contrary to what is often
claimed, transfers of parental responsibility are not in fact commonplace. The second is that
parental obligations do not seem to be the kind of obligation that can be unilaterally transferred.
It is worth emphasizing that I have not defended the claim that gamete donors do in fact have
parental responsibilities towards their biological offspring. My own view on the matter, which I
cannot outline in full here, is that the question of donor responsibility requires a more ﬁne-grained
treatment than simply asking whether donors do or do not acquire parental responsibility. What the
preceding critique does show is that we cannot dismiss this complex problem by claiming that any
responsibilities that do arise for donors can simply be transferred to others.
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